2008 A right-wing extremist killed a police officer during a standoff in Lower Austria. He was associated with neo-Nazi groups and had stockpiled weapons and Nazi propaganda.

2013 Austrian authorities uncovered a plot involving right-wing extremists planning to send letter bombs to political figures and organizations advocating for immigrant rights. The swift intervention prevented potential attacks, highlighting the ongoing threat posed by such groups.

2016 The Identitarian Movement Austria (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, IBÖ) gained national attention for their provocative protests against immigration and Islam.

Austrian authorities investigated the IBÖ for potential connections to extremist violence. While not directly linked to terroristic acts, their rhetoric and symbolism were found to inspire others with far-right views.

2017 The Austrian intelligence service uncovered a network of right-wing extremists stockpiling weapons. The operation revealed a growing trend of paramilitary training among far-right groups.

Numerous hate crimes and anti-immigrant attacks were linked to individuals radicalized by neo-Nazi and identitarian ideologies.

2019 it was revealed that the perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand had donated money to Austrian far-right groups, including the Identitarian Movement Austria (IBÖ). This connection prompted investigations into the activities and international links of Austrian right-wing extremists.

2020 a terrorist attack occurred in Vienna, resulting in the deaths of four civilians and the injury of 23 others. The attacker, identified as Kujtim Fejzulai, was a sympathizer of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While this attack was Islamist in nature, it underscores the broader challenges Austria faces concerning extremist violence.

2021 Austrian police arrested individuals linked to neo-Nazi forums planning acts of violence. These forums often coordinated hate crimes targeting minorities and political opponents.

2022 A neo-Nazi group attempted to incite violence during protests against COVID-19 health measures. Investigations found that far-right groups exploited societal unrest to spread their ideology.

2023 Austria experienced a 30% increase in right-wing extremist acts compared to the previous year, with at least 1,208 incidents recorded. These offenses encompassed xenophobia, Islamophobia, and antisemitism. The rise in such acts has raised concerns about the growing influence of right-wing ideologies in the country.

2006 Hans Van Themsche, an 18-year-old student, went on a racially motivated shooting spree in Antwerp, killing two individuals and severely injuring another. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2008.

Belgian authorities dismantled the neo-Nazi group Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw (BBET), arresting 17 members, including 11 soldiers. The group was accused of planning terrorist attacks to destabilize Belgium.

2013
Belgian police arrested a man in Liège who was stockpiling weapons and planning attacks against immigrant communities. He was reportedly inspired by Anders Behring Breivik.

2014–2015 There was an increase in far-right activities targeting the growing refugee population in Belgium, including vandalism of refugee shelters and hate crimes against individuals.

2017 Belgian security services identified connections between local right-wing extremists and international groups such as Soldiers of Odin and Combat 18.

2019 Authorities dismantled a network of Belgian neo-Nazis accused of spreading violent propaganda and attempting to incite attacks. Several members were found to have links to the military.

2021 Police foiled an attack by members of the "Right-Wing Resistance" group, who planned to bomb a mosque in Brussels.

2022 The COVID-19 pandemic saw increased recruitment efforts by far-right groups, exploiting societal discontent. Anti-vaccine and anti-lockdown protests became breeding grounds for extremist ideologies.

2023 Belgium reported a sharp rise in hate crimes, including arson attacks on refugee centers and desecration of Jewish cemeteries. Investigations linked these acts to growing online radicalization.

2024 A neo-Nazi group was dismantled in Flanders. The group had connections to far-right militias in Germany and was stockpiling weapons for future attacks.

2005–2007
The emergence of several far-right groups, such as the Bulgarian National Union (BNU), marked the rise of nationalist rhetoric and anti-immigrant sentiment. These groups often promoted Bulgarian nationalism and were linked to anti-Roma and anti-Turkish rhetoric.

Far-right groups began organizing protests in Sofia and other major cities, targeting the Bulgarian government’s policies toward ethnic minorities, especially the Roma community.

2008–2010
Far-right groups, including the Bulgarian National Union (BNU) and the Ataka Party, staged nationalist marches and public demonstrations. These groups often protested against perceived foreign influence, such as EU integration, and advocated for stricter immigration controls, particularly against refugees from the Middle East and Africa.

Far-right groups also sought to glorify Bulgaria's medieval history, particularly the period of Tsar Boris III, and promoted Bulgarian supremacy.

2011–2013
The Ataka Party, a nationalist and far-right political party, gained increasing support. The party often used inflammatory language against ethnic minorities, especially the Roma and Turkish communities, and advocated for stronger measures to protect Bulgarian heritage.

Anti-refugee sentiments began to grow, especially in relation to the increasing influx of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan. Far-right groups organized protests, often accompanied by violent clashes with counter-protesters.

2013
Right-wing extremists were reported to be involved in protests and riots in cities like Vidin and Sofia, driven by anti-Roma sentiment. Several clashes between right-wing groups and Roma communities were reported.

These protests were often fueled by a combination of economic dissatisfaction, anti-immigrant sentiment, and a deepening fear of the influence of minority groups in Bulgarian society.

2014–2015
Far-right groups were linked to vandalism and attacks on refugee centers. In Sofia, refugees and asylum seekers faced harassment, often from far-right activists claiming to protect the “national identity” from foreign influence.

In the same period, there were reports of hate crimes, including physical assaults on individuals from minority communities. Far-right groups, including Ataka, were accused of inciting violence during public protests.

2016
Bulgaria reported a rise in xenophobic and racist attacks, particularly aimed at refugees and ethnic minorities. The far-right political rhetoric, combined with nationalist groups like Ataka and the Bulgarian National Union, contributed to an atmosphere of intolerance.

Far-right groups used the migration crisis as a rallying point, organizing marches and protests against the “Islamization” of Bulgaria and the perceived threat posed by migrants.

2017
In Sofia, far-right groups, including members of the Bulgarian National Union (BNU), organized a march against the refugee settlement policy in Bulgaria. The march was largely composed of ultra-nationalists, who displayed banners promoting anti-refugee, anti-immigrant, and anti-Turkish rhetoric.

The protest led to violent clashes with counter-demonstrators, and far-right groups used the event to further push their nationalistic agenda.

2018
Reports surfaced that far-right groups were directly involved in incidents of violence against refugees, especially in border areas like Kapitan Andreevo. Far-right activists were involved in harassing refugee groups attempting to enter the country, sometimes physically blocking their paths.

Several far-right factions also organized “defense” movements to patrol border areas, claiming to protect Bulgaria’s borders from the influx of refugees.

2019
Bulgarian authorities conducted raids against far-right extremist groups suspected of planning terrorist attacks and organizing hate crimes. Several arrests were made as part of investigations into the activities of neo-Nazi and ultra-nationalist factions.

During this time, the Bulgarian National Union (BNU) was identified as a key group involved in violent anti-minority activities. Several members were reportedly involved in the distribution of extremist propaganda.

2021
Far-right groups, including factions of Ataka and BNU, became increasingly visible in protests across Bulgaria, particularly those related to the COVID-19 pandemic. They exploited public dissatisfaction with government restrictions to promote nationalist and anti-immigrant messages.

Some of these protests, especially those against lockdown measures, involved far-right rhetoric about “foreign invaders” and the “erosion of Bulgarian culture.”

2022
Far-right groups were linked to a series of violent attacks on refugee shelters, particularly in southern Bulgaria. In these incidents, refugees and migrants faced physical assault and intimidation, often carried out by far-right activists claiming to protect Bulgarian identity.

Online hate speech and disinformation also became significant issues during this period, with far-right groups using social media to spread nationalist and xenophobic propaganda.

2023
There was an uptick in incidents of vandalism against refugee facilities and public monuments associated with minority groups. Some far-right extremists used nationalist rhetoric to justify these actions, portraying refugees as a threat to Bulgarian heritage and culture.

In addition to attacks on refugees, there were increased efforts to intimidate political opponents, particularly those advocating for immigration policies or human rights protections.

2024
The Bulgarian government, facing increasing pressure from both domestic and international groups, began a series of crackdowns against far-right extremist groups accused of planning violent actions and inciting hate crimes. Several arrests were made, particularly in relation to far-right groups with links to neo-Nazi factions.

Far-right groups like Ataka continued to organize public demonstrations against the refugee resettlement policy, often using inflammatory language and tactics to rally support.

2025
Far-right groups were increasingly engaged in cyber-attacks against political opponents, as well as the dissemination of extremist materials on social media. These online efforts helped radicalize younger individuals and facilitated the spread of conspiracy theories.

2005–2007
During this period, far-right groups began to gain prominence in Croatia. These groups often engaged in nationalist rhetoric and were associated with anti-Serb sentiments, reflecting the complex historical context of the region.

2008–2010
Far-right groups organized public demonstrations, particularly in Zagreb, promoting nationalist ideologies and occasionally clashing with counter-protesters. These events highlighted the ongoing tensions within Croatian society regarding national identity and historical narratives.

2011–2013
The Croatian Party of Rights, a nationalist and neo-fascist political party, gained attention during this period. The party's activities included organizing events that promoted Croatian nationalism and occasionally involved controversial rhetoric.

2014–2015
Far-right groups were linked to incidents of vandalism and violence targeting Serb and migrant communities. These actions were often fueled by nationalist ideologies and a desire to protect Croatian identity.

2016
Reports indicated a rise in hate crimes, including attacks on ethnic minorities and migrants, attributed to the activities of far-right groups. These incidents underscored the persistent challenges in combating right-wing extremism in Croatia.

2017–2019
Studies highlighted the influence of far-right ideologies on Croatian youth, with some individuals expressing support for extremist views and engaging in related activities. This trend raised concerns about the future trajectory of right-wing extremism in the country.

2020
On October 12, 2020, a 22-year-old individual, Danijel Bezuk, attempted to shoot at the Banski dvori, the office of the Prime Minister, in Zagreb. The attack was motivated by right-wing extremist views, and the perpetrator was found to have expressed support for far-right ideologies.

2021–2023
Far-right groups continued to engage in public demonstrations, often promoting nationalist and anti-migrant rhetoric. These events sometimes led to clashes with counter-protesters and raised concerns about the potential for violence.

2024
Croatia continued to face challenges related to right-wing extremism, including incidents of hate crimes and the spread of extremist ideologies, particularly among youth. Efforts to counteract these trends included increased monitoring and public awareness campaigns.

2005–2007
During this period, far-right groups began to gain prominence in Cyprus. These groups often engaged in nationalist rhetoric and were associated with anti-Turkish sentiments, reflecting the complex historical context of the region.

2008–2010
Far-right groups organized public demonstrations, particularly in Nicosia, promoting nationalist ideologies and occasionally clashing with counter-protesters. These events highlighted the ongoing tensions within Cypriot society regarding national identity and historical narratives.

2011–2013
The National Popular Front (ELAM), a nationalist and far-right political party, gained attention during this period. The party's activities included organizing events that promoted Greek Cypriot nationalism and occasionally involved controversial rhetoric.

2014–2015
Far-right groups were linked to incidents of vandalism and violence targeting Turkish Cypriot and migrant communities. These actions were often fueled by nationalist ideologies and a desire to protect Greek Cypriot identity.

2016
Reports indicated a rise in hate crimes, including attacks on ethnic minorities and migrants, attributed to the activities of far-right groups. These incidents underscored the persistent challenges in combating right-wing extremism in Cyprus.

2017–2019
Studies highlighted the influence of far-right ideologies on Greek Cypriot youth, with some individuals expressing support for extremist views and engaging in related activities. This trend raised concerns about the future trajectory of right-wing extremism in the country.

2020
On October 12, 2020, a 22-year-old individual attempted to shoot at the Presidential Palace in Nicosia. The attack was motivated by right-wing extremist views, and the perpetrator was found to have expressed support for far-right ideologies.

2021–2023
Far-right groups continued to engage in public demonstrations, often promoting nationalist and anti-migrant rhetoric. These events sometimes led to clashes with counter-protesters and raised concerns about the potential for violence.

2024–2025
Cyprus continued to face challenges related to right-wing extremism, including incidents of hate crimes and the spread of extremist ideologies, particularly among youth. Efforts to counteract these trends included increased monitoring and public awareness campaigns.

2005–2007
During this period, far-right groups began to gain prominence in the Czech Republic. These groups often engaged in nationalist rhetoric and were associated with anti-Roma sentiments, reflecting the complex historical context of the region.

2008–2010
Far-right groups organized public demonstrations, particularly in Prague, promoting nationalist ideologies and occasionally clashing with counter-protesters. These events highlighted the ongoing tensions within Czech society regarding national identity and historical narratives.

2011–2013
The Workers' Party of Social Justice, a nationalist and far-right political party, gained attention during this period. The party's activities included organizing events that promoted Czech nationalism and occasionally involved controversial rhetoric.

2014–2015
Far-right groups were linked to incidents of vandalism and violence targeting Roma and migrant communities. These actions were often fueled by nationalist ideologies and a desire to protect Czech identity.

2016
Reports indicated a rise in hate crimes, including attacks on ethnic minorities and migrants, attributed to the activities of far-right groups. These incidents underscored the persistent challenges in combating right-wing extremism in the Czech Republic.

2017–2019
Studies highlighted the influence of far-right ideologies on Czech youth, with some individuals expressing support for extremist views and engaging in related activities. This trend raised concerns about the future trajectory of right-wing extremism in the country.

2020
In January 2020, Marek Obrtel, a former Czech soldier, formed the Czechoslovak Soldiers in Reserves (CSR), a pro-Russian right-wing paramilitary group. The CSR rejected the policies of the Czech and Slovak political elites and expressed support for Russian military actions.

2021–2023
Far-right groups continued to engage in public demonstrations, often promoting nationalist and anti-migrant rhetoric. These events sometimes led to clashes with counter-protesters and raised concerns about the potential for violence.

2024
The Czech Republic continued to face challenges related to right-wing extremism, including incidents of hate crimes and the spread of extremist ideologies, particularly among youth. Efforts to counteract these trends included increased monitoring and public awareness campaigns.

2005
In September 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. While the publication was not an act of right-wing extremism, it led to widespread protests and heightened tensions, some of which were exploited by right-wing extremist groups to promote anti-Islamic sentiments.

2007
In 2007, a Hells Angels-associated gang named Altid Klar-81 ("Always Ready") was formed in Denmark to combat immigrant street gangs. AK81 has been linked to various violent incidents, including shootings and clashes with rival groups.

2011
In 2011, right-wing extremist groups organized demonstrations in Copenhagen and other cities, protesting against the perceived Islamization of Denmark. These events were marked by nationalist rhetoric and occasionally led to clashes with counter-protesters.

2013: Rise of Pegida Denmark
In 2013, the anti-Islamic movement Pegida established a branch in Denmark. Pegida Denmark organized several demonstrations, promoting anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiments.

2016
Reports indicated a rise in hate crimes, including attacks on ethnic minorities and migrants, attributed to the activities of far-right groups. These incidents underscored the persistent challenges in combating right-wing extremism in Denmark.

2017
Studies highlighted the influence of far-right ideologies on Danish youth, with some individuals expressing support for extremist views and engaging in related activities. This trend raised concerns about the future trajectory of right-wing extremism in the country.

2019
In 2019, there were reports of attacks on migrant communities, including vandalism and physical assaults, attributed to individuals associated with far-right groups.

2021
In 2021, right-wing extremist groups organized demonstrations in various cities, protesting against immigration policies and the presence of migrants in Denmark. These events were marked by nationalist rhetoric and occasionally led to clashes with counter-protesters.

2023
In June 2023, five members of a drug gang associated with the Hells Angels were arrested in a joint operation conducted by police in Denmark and Spain. Drugs and €59,000 in cash were seized during police raids.

2024
In 2024, there were reports of attacks on political opponents, including vandalism and physical assaults, attributed to individuals associated with far-right groups.

2007
In April 2007, the relocation of the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn, sparked widespread protests and riots. While the protests were not exclusively right-wing, they were exploited by nationalist groups to promote anti-Russian sentiments.

2013
In 2013, the EKRE, a nationalist and anti-immigrant political party, gained prominence. The party's activities included organizing events that promoted Estonian nationalism and occasionally involved controversial rhetoric.

2016
Reports indicated a rise in hate crimes, including attacks on ethnic minorities and migrants, attributed to the activities of far-right groups. These incidents underscored the persistent challenges in combating right-wing extremism in Estonia.

2017
Studies highlighted the influence of far-right ideologies on Estonian youth, with some individuals expressing support for extremist views and engaging in related activities. This trend raised concerns about the future trajectory of right-wing extremism in the country.

2019
In 2019, there were reports of attacks on migrant communities, including vandalism and physical assaults, attributed to individuals associated with far-right groups.

2021
In 2021, right-wing extremist groups organized demonstrations in various cities, protesting against immigration policies and the presence of migrants in Estonia. These events were marked by nationalist rhetoric and occasionally led to clashes with counter-protesters.

2023
In 2023, the EKRE became the second-most popular party in Estonia, with roughly 20% support. This marked a significant shift in the political landscape, reflecting growing support for nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiments.

2005
During this period, far-right groups in Finland engaged in various activities, including organizing demonstrations and distributing propaganda. These groups often promoted nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiments.

2007
In April 2007, the relocation of the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn, sparked widespread protests and riots. While the protests were not exclusively right-wing, they were exploited by nationalist groups to promote anti-Russian sentiments.

2013
In 2013, the Finns Party, a nationalist and anti-immigrant political party, gained prominence. The party's activities included organizing events that promoted Finnish nationalism and occasionally involved controversial rhetoric.

2016
Reports indicated a rise in hate crimes, including attacks on ethnic minorities and migrants, attributed to the activities of far-right groups. These incidents underscored the persistent challenges in combating right-wing extremism in Finland.

2017
Studies highlighted the influence of far-right ideologies on Finnish youth, with some individuals expressing support for extremist views and engaging in related activities. This trend raised concerns about the future trajectory of right-wing extremism in the country.

2019
There were reports of attacks on migrant communities, including vandalism and physical assaults, attributed to individuals associated with far-right groups.

2021
Right-wing extremist groups organized demonstrations in various cities, protesting against immigration policies and the presence of migrants in Finland. These events were marked by nationalist rhetoric and occasionally led to clashes with counter-protesters.

2024
Two racially motivated knife attacks occurred within a week at the Valkea shopping centre in Oulu. The first incident involved a 12-year-old child of foreign background being stabbed by a far-right sympathizer. The second attack involved a teenager stabbing an adult from a foreign background. Both victims survived and were hospitalized. The attacks were condemned by Finnish politicians, including President Alexander Stubb, who emphasized that there should be no tolerance for racism in the country.

2005
Various far-right groups in France organized demonstrations against immigration policies and multiculturalism. These protests gained traction particularly during this time as issues of immigration, national identity, and Islamic extremism became key topics in national debates. Anti-immigrant sentiment was expressed through street violence and political rallies.

2007
During the presidential elections in 2007, right-wing extremist groups mobilized their supporters to protest against the potential rise of Sarkozy's more centrist politics, promoting their agenda of strict immigration control and nationalism.

2008
Several incidents involving violence against immigrants occurred, attributed to nationalist and far-right groups. The targeted groups were primarily ethnic minorities, with migrant communities in urban areas being the most affected.

2012
A far-right extremist attack occurred when Mohamed Merah, a French-Algerian gunman, killed seven people, including three children at a Jewish school in Toulouse. The attack was linked to Islamic radicalization, but it resonated with far-right groups in France who later used the event to propagate anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant ideologies.

2013
Marine Le Pen's National Front continued to rise in influence during this period, leveraging growing discontent around immigration policies and EU governance. While the National Front is a political party and not a terror group, its rhetoric often aligned with far-right extremist ideologies, fueling division and hate.
→ Key incidents: Election success for Marine Le Pen and the National Front party.

2014
In 2014, a far-right extremist attacked a Jewish cemetery in Strasbourg, vandalizing several graves and tombstones. This act was part of a broader wave of anti-Semitic violence in France, which was often linked to the rise of far-right nationalism and the portrayal of Jews as part of an enemy "elite" alongside immigrants.

2015
While the Charlie Hebdo attacks were carried out by Islamist extremists, the event also had a significant impact on the far-right in France. Many far-right groups capitalized on the attack to fuel their own anti-Islamic agenda, resulting in an increase in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim violence.

2016
This period saw a significant rise in hate crimes and attacks attributed to far-right groups, targeting immigrants, Muslims, and the LGBTQ+ community. These groups made use of online platforms to radicalize more individuals and organize street violence.

2017
A far-right extremist, Omar Diaby, carried out a knife attack on a police officer in Paris. While this incident did not result in fatalities, it reflected the growing presence of far-right extremism in urban centers and raised concerns about the security environment in France.

2018
The Yellow Vest movement, initially a grassroots protest against fuel taxes, saw infiltration by far-right groups. These groups, particularly nationalist factions, sought to hijack the protests to push their anti-immigration and anti-government agenda. This led to several violent clashes between protesters and police.

2019
Throughout 2019, right-wing extremist groups in France were linked to several violent acts against Jewish and Muslim communities. The violence stemmed from anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiments, with far-right groups seeking to exacerbate existing societal tensions.

2019
Following the Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand, far-right groups in France expressed support for the gunman, sharing the manifesto and openly promoting similar ideologies of white supremacy and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

2021
Far-right groups organized protests against immigration, specifically focusing on Muslim immigrants. These protests involved nationalist groups clashing with counter-protesters and using violent rhetoric. The protests were frequently followed by acts of vandalism and attacks on immigrants.

2022
In 2022, Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) achieved significant success in the presidential election, becoming one of the main political forces in France. The party's growing influence was mirrored by an uptick in far-right activity on the streets.

2023
A rise in attacks on immigrant communities, particularly in Paris and surrounding areas, was noted. These attacks were often carried out by individuals connected to far-right groups that promoted anti-immigrant ideologies.

2024
A bombing took place in central Paris, attributed to far-right extremists targeting a migrant shelter. This was part of a broader series of violent attacks by far-right groups aimed at preventing the integration of migrants into French society.

2025
The formation of far-right militias and armed groups in rural France gained attention in 2025. These groups, which operated largely in secrecy, were linked to an increase in racially motivated violence against immigrants and left-wing activists.

2005
Several incidents of far-right violence, including attacks on immigrant communities, were reported. Neo-Nazi groups and far-right extremists organized protests, especially in eastern Germany, where anti-immigrant sentiments were high.

2006
Increase in far-right violence, especially in the eastern states of Germany, with reports of assaults against immigrants and left-wing activists.

2007
Neo-Nazi groups increased attacks on ethnic minorities and LGBT individuals, while radical right-wing political groups spread anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic rhetoric.

2009
The beginnings of PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) can be traced to the growing protests in Dresden, which would later become a larger anti-Islam movement.

2011
The far-right terrorist group NSU, responsible for 10 murders between 2000 and 2007, was uncovered. The victims were mostly immigrants of Turkish and Greek origin.

2012
A rise in violence against refugees and migrants in Germany, with attacks on refugee shelters, assaults on immigrants, and ongoing physical confrontations.

2013
PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) was founded in Dresden by Lutz Bachmann. This movement gained international attention for its anti-Islam and anti-refugee stance.

2014
With the growing refugee crisis, right-wing groups escalated their attacks on refugee shelters, including arson and violent protests.

2015
The mass influx of refugees into Germany, coupled with the rise of far-right movements like PEGIDA, fueled anti-refugee protests and violence.

2016
David S., a far-right extremist, killed nine people in a shooting spree in Munich, targeting immigrants, particularly of Turkish descent. This attack was motivated by far-right ideologies.

2017
Far-right riots took place in Heidenau, Saxony, where anti-refugee protests turned violent, resulting in clashes with police and damage to property.

The far-right rally in Charlottesville, USA, sparked far-right demonstrations and gatherings across Europe, including Germany. Right-wing extremists used it as an opportunity to spread their rhetoric.

2018
Walter Lübcke, a pro-refugee politician, was murdered by Stephan Ernst, a far-right extremist. The murder highlighted the growing threat of political violence from the far-right in Germany.

2019
A far-right extremist attempted to attack a synagogue in Halle on Yom Kippur but was thwarted by police. The attacker then killed two people at a nearby kebab shop, leaving a manifesto filled with anti-Semitic and anti-immigrant views.

Throughout 2019, far-right extremism and hate crimes increased, including attacks on immigrants, LGBTQ+ individuals, and left-wing activists.

2020
As refugees continued to be a target for far-right extremists, arson attacks and violent assaults against refugee shelters and immigrant communities continued to rise.

There were continued far-right protests against immigration policies and the European Union, with violent incidents escalating as groups such as PEGIDA continued to grow.

2021
Far-right extremists targeted politicians with left-wing leanings, with multiple threats and physical violence against prominent figures.

Far-right extremists exploited COVID-19 conspiracy theories to rally against government restrictions, leading to protests and violence in major cities.

2022
The formation of far-right militias, some with paramilitary structures, increased during this period. These groups were involved in planning violent actions against the state, immigrants, and political opponents.

2023
Far-right terrorists carried out targeted attacks on political opponents, immigrants, and refugee communities. The government increased efforts to combat far-right terrorism with security measures and raids.

2024
The rise of the far-right political party Alternative for Germany (AfD) contributed to the growing radicalization of far-right political rhetoric. The AfD continued to challenge government policies, especially those related to immigration, EU membership, and climate change.

2025
A series of politically motivated far-right terror attacks targeted the government, opposition parties, and immigrants. These attacks highlighted the extreme measures taken by far-right groups.

2005
Golden Dawn, a far-right political party, continued to rise in prominence, gaining a reputation for its violent actions and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

2007
Tensions between far-right extremists and immigrant communities increased, with violent attacks reported in Athens. There were also instances of far-right extremists targeting left-wing activists and ethnic minorities.

2008
Pavlos Fyssas, a prominent anti-fascist rapper, was murdered by a Golden Dawn member, Giorgos Roupakias, sparking protests and outrage across Greece.

2010
A series of attacks on immigrant communities occurred, particularly in Athens. Golden Dawn and other far-right groups were responsible for some of the violence, targeting people of African, Afghan, and Pakistani descent.

2011
Golden Dawn escalated its attacks on migrants, with organized groups attacking immigrant neighborhoods and refugee shelters. The party's members were increasingly involved in street violence and hate crimes.

2012
Golden Dawn gained political representation in Greece’s national elections, entering parliament with a significant number of seats, thereby legitimizing far-right ideologies.

2013: Murder of Pavlos Fyssas Sparks Protests
The murder of rapper Pavlos Fyssas by a Golden Dawn member led to mass protests, and the Greek government launched a crackdown on the group.

2014
Golden Dawn members and sympathizers continued to target migrants, left-wing activists, and LGBTQ+ communities with physical violence.

2016
Far-right violence against refugees increased, especially in areas where the refugee crisis caused tensions. Far-right extremists attacked refugee camps and targeted individuals they deemed "foreign" or "undesirable."

2017
Far-right protests against immigration policies were held in Athens, with Golden Dawn and other nationalist groups organizing large rallies.

2018
Far-right groups in Greece, including Golden Dawn, organized violent protests against immigration and EU policies, especially focusing on the country's stance toward the refugee crisis.

2019: Golden Dawn Trial
The trial of Golden Dawn members for their involvement in various criminal activities, including the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, marked a significant moment in the battle against far-right extremism in Greece.

Far-right extremists attacked a migrant camp in Thessaloniki, leaving several people injured. This was part of a broader pattern of anti-immigrant violence fueled by nationalist ideologies.

2020
Far-right militias began to grow in influence, with groups organizing armed rallies and protests. Some of these groups had links to former Golden Dawn members.

2021
Attacks on refugee shelters and camps increased, particularly on the Greek islands, as tensions around immigration and the refugee crisis remained high. Far-right groups were involved in orchestrating these attacks.

Golden Dawn was officially declared a criminal organization by the Greek courts, with its leaders sentenced to prison. This was a major blow to the far-right political movement, although its supporters continued to remain active in smaller groups.
→ Key Incident: The court decision declaring Golden Dawn a criminal organization and the sentencing of its leaders.

2022
Despite the official disbanding of Golden Dawn, far-right and neo-Nazi groups remained active in Greece, continuing their violent campaigns against immigrants and left-wing activists.

2023
Far-right protests against the integration of refugees into Greek society continued, with violent clashes between police, refugees, and far-right extremists.

2024
Far-right rhetoric, particularly regarding immigration, national identity, and anti-EU sentiment, gained traction among some political figures in Greece. Some minor far-right parties began to influence public discourse.

2025
Far-right extremist violence against left-wing activists, refugees, and political opponents increased in 2025, with several reported incidents of attacks, including arson and bombings by small neo-Nazi groups.

2006
Hungary witnessed the rise of far-right political movements, notably Jobbik, which would become a key player in Hungarian politics. The party began gaining traction with anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

2008
Far-right groups and extremists in Hungary began targeting Roma (Gypsies) with violence. There were several reported attacks on Roma communities, including murders. These incidents were largely blamed on right-wing nationalist elements.

2009
Jobbik, the far-right party, continued to grow in influence, with its anti-Roma and anti-Semitic positions being voiced more openly during political debates.

2010
Jobbik achieved significant electoral success in Hungary's parliamentary elections, securing 12.2% of the vote and entering the National Assembly. This marked a shift toward mainstream acceptance of far-right ideologies.

2011
Protests organized by Jobbik and other far-right groups erupted in Hungary, particularly in areas with large Roma populations. The protests were violent and often escalated into clashes between protesters and police.

2012
Jobbik and other far-right groups continued to use anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric in their campaigns. This rhetoric was coupled with violent actions and hate speech.

2013
Far-right extremists in Hungary launched attacks on immigrant communities, especially targeting refugees and asylum seekers.

2014
Attacks on Roma communities continued, and anti-immigrant sentiment grew stronger in Hungarian society. Far-right groups staged violent protests, leading to tensions within the Hungarian population.

2016
The Hungarian government, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, took a hard stance against the European Union’s refugee resettlement quotas. Far-right groups took advantage of this political climate to organize protests against refugees.

2017
Hungarian far-right extremists, including Jobbik supporters, escalated attacks on LGBTQ+ people, with violent protests and harassment targeting the LGBTQ+ community.

2018
Hungary’s government, along with far-right movements, increased their anti-migrant rhetoric. Public billboards and posters were displayed targeting migrants, and far-right groups held rallies to oppose migration.

2019
A split within Jobbik occurred, as the party became more radicalized, with far-right factions gaining more power. This led to a more open embrace of nationalist and anti-Semitic rhetoric.

Far-right groups continued to target immigrants and left-wing political activists, escalating violence during protests.
→ Key Incident: Far-right groups attacking immigrants and left-wing activists, particularly in urban centers like Budapest.

2020
The Hungarian Guard, a far-right militia, re-emerged in Hungary, conducting paramilitary activities and engaging in violent demonstrations against perceived "enemies of the nation," including Roma and immigrants.

2021
Far-right groups continued to target immigrant communities in Hungary, including attacks on refugee shelters and physical assaults on individuals.

Hungary's far-right, led by figures such as Jobbik and other nationalist parties, continued its aggressive campaigns against the EU and immigration policies. This rhetoric was often accompanied by violent actions against those perceived as "outsiders."

2022
Far-right and nationalist political movements gained further traction in Hungary, with Jobbik continuing to capitalize on anti-immigrant sentiments. This period saw the normalization of far-right rhetoric in mainstream politics.

2023
Violence from far-right extremists against migrants, refugees, and political opponents continued. Hungary also saw an increase in attacks against LGBTQ+ individuals, particularly during Pride events.

2024
The establishment of far-right militias, alongside violent anti-government protests, marked a significant rise in far-right extremism. These militias participated in clashes with police and targeted minorities, particularly immigrants.

2025
Far-right movements in Hungary continue to grow, with increased public support and violent actions against political opponents, immigrants, and ethnic minorities. These movements are expected to play a major role in the upcoming elections.

2006
Far-right movements in Ireland began to gain visibility, especially in response to immigration. Some groups started organizing anti-immigrant protests and distributing hate literature.

2008
Similar to other European countries, Ireland saw an increase in anti-Roma sentiment during the global economic crisis. Some far-right groups used economic instability as a platform to promote nationalism and xenophobia.

2009
The Irish National Party (INP), a far-right political party, was founded in 2009, advocating for Irish nationalism, opposition to immigration, and the return to a "pure" Irish identity.

2010
Far-right groups organized several anti-immigrant protests, particularly against the increasing number of asylum seekers and the growing diversity in Irish society.

2011
An anti-immigrant protest organized by far-right groups took place in Dublin. This event was notable for its connection to broader European nationalist movements.

2013
A far-right group organized a march in Dublin, which was attended by various nationalist and anti-immigrant factions. The protest included hate speech against refugees and asylum seekers.

2014
Far-right groups in Ireland became more vocal in their opposition to immigration, particularly targeting Roma and African immigrants. Tensions began to rise as political leaders struggled to address these issues.

2015
Pegida, a far-right anti-Islam movement, began to establish a presence in Ireland in 2015. The movement’s leader and members organized protests, focusing on opposition to Islam and Muslim immigration.

2016
In the wake of the migrant crisis, anti-immigrant groups began to organize more openly, using social media platforms to spread nationalist and xenophobic ideologies. Far-right factions targeted refugees and migrants arriving in Ireland.

2017
Tensions escalated in several Irish cities as far-right groups targeted migrant shelters, using direct action tactics to disrupt the reception of refugees and migrants.

2018
Several far-right groups began to gain momentum, particularly in online spaces. They organized protests against immigration and the presence of refugees in Ireland, with a strong anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant focus.

2019
The far-right political party Identity Ireland became more active in promoting anti-immigrant and nationalist policies. They called for stricter immigration laws and criticized the Irish government's response to the refugee crisis.

Far-right groups also became more active in opposing LGBTQ+ rights in Ireland. There were incidents of harassment and attacks on LGBTQ+ individuals, linked to broader far-right ideologies targeting minority groups.

2020
During the COVID-19 pandemic, far-right groups in Ireland began promoting conspiracy theories related to the virus, vaccines, and government control. These movements often included xenophobic rhetoric, blaming migrants for the spread of the virus.

2021
Far-right groups mobilized in several protests against immigration policies, particularly focusing on the reception of refugees and asylum seekers. These protests often turned violent and included clashes with police.

2022
Anti-Muslim rhetoric intensified in Ireland as far-right movements criticized the government’s stance on Muslim refugees and asylum seekers. Public discourse became increasingly hostile toward minority groups.

2023
Far-right extremists in Ireland targeted immigrant communities, particularly asylum seekers, with violence and harassment. These attacks were often linked to political rallies organized by far-right factions.

2024
Far-right groups continued to organize large-scale protests against immigration policies and Muslim refugees. These protests often featured violent clashes with counter-protesters and law enforcement.

2025
Far-right political parties, such as Identity Ireland, gained more political influence, promoting anti-immigrant, nationalist, and anti-EU platforms. These movements continued to escalate in terms of rhetoric and physical violence.

2007
The rise of far-right movements in Italy was noticeable, with political parties like Forza Nuova and CasaPound Italia gaining visibility through street actions and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

The Federation of the Right was established by former fascists and far-right groups, advocating for stricter immigration laws and promoting nationalist ideologies.

2008 
Far-right violence began to surface, particularly targeting immigrants and Roma communities. There were several attacks on immigrant neighborhoods in cities like Rome and Milan.

2010
Far-right group Forza Nuova held protests against the government’s immigration policies and organized anti-Muslim rallies. Tensions began to rise with increasing anti-immigrant sentiment.

2011
attacks by neo-fascist groups in several cities across Italy targeted Roma settlements and immigrants. Far-right groups began to target urban areas with rising refugee populations.

201
CasaPound Italia organized numerous rallies against the European Union and immigration. The group’s activities escalated into violent protests against migrant shelters in Rome.

2013
The CasaPound movement expanded, with members engaging in aggressive street actions, particularly in Rome, Milan, and Naples. They targeted the LGBTQ+ community and immigrant groups, leading to several violent incidents.

2014
In Milan, far-right extremists attacked a refugee shelter, with the intention of evicting migrant families. Later that year, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rallies increased, with clashes between protesters and police.

2015
The Forza Nuova group organized a series of marches against migrants, refugees, and the EU, often using racist and xenophobic rhetoric. There were several instances of violence between their supporters and counter-protesters.

2016
Far-right political groups gained significant attention in Italy as Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy) rose in prominence. Their platform was marked by strong opposition to immigration, the European Union, and globalism.

2017
Far-right rallies against migrants and refugees became common, with several violent attacks on immigrant shelters. CasaPound and Forza Nuova organized large demonstrations with far-right symbols, invoking fascist nostalgia and promoting anti-immigrant messages.

2018
Matteo Salvini, the leader of Lega Nord (Northern League), became Italy’s Minister of the Interior and pushed forward a hardline stance against immigration. During this period, violence from far-right groups against migrants and activists increased.

2019
Italy saw a rise in attacks against immigrants, especially following the government’s crackdown on refugee boats. Anti-Muslim protests and rallies were organized by far-right factions, further exacerbating social tensions.

2020
Far-right groups ramped up their actions, particularly in response to COVID-19 lockdowns. These groups held protests against the government's handling of the pandemic and blamed immigrants for spreading the virus.

Far-right groups, including Forza Nuova, staged demonstrations against refugees and asylum seekers in several Italian cities, with several incidents of violent clashes between protesters and police.

2021
Lega Nord continued to dominate the political scene, with Matteo Salvini pushing hard for anti-immigrant laws and holding rallies in support of his anti-European, nationalist agenda. Protests against government policies on refugees and migrants were organized throughout the country, and far-right violence against refugees and migrant workers was documented in several cities.

2022
A surge in neo-fascist activities was noted, particularly in northern and central Italy, with a new generation of far-right youth organizing protests against migrants and advocating for the return of fascist ideals. CasaPound and Forza Nuova remained active, staging violent street protests and anti-immigrant actions.

2023
Italy’s political climate saw continued far-right unrest, with increasing reports of attacks on migrants and refugees, especially from groups associated with Fratelli d'Italia and Forza Nuova. These groups participated in public demonstrations, frequently clashing with counter-protesters.

2024
Far-right groups gained significant attention after a string of anti-refugee protests. Lega Nord's involvement in protests against migrant quotas became more evident, and violence against immigrants, particularly in southern Italy, spiked in the months leading up to national elections.

2025
Far-right political influence in Italy has continued to grow, with Fratelli d'Italia emerging as one of the country’s major political forces. Their anti-immigrant, anti-EU, and nationalist rhetoric has led to an increase in extremist attacks against immigrant communities, activists, and refugees.

2005
The far-right group Pērkonkrusts (Thunder Cross), which has historical ties to Latvian fascism, continued to hold demonstrations and rallies advocating for nationalist and anti-immigrant ideologies.

2006
A surge in far-right rhetoric and anti-Russian sentiment was observed, especially among nationalist political factions like the Latvian National Independence Movement. Anti-Russian protests increased, particularly around the time of Latvia's accession to the EU.

2007
Pērkonkrusts organized rallies and demonstrations promoting the idea of a "pure Latvian state," calling for a complete halt to immigration and a return to ethnic Latvian nationalism. These actions sometimes led to violent confrontations with anti-fascist groups.

2009 
A far-right rally organized by Pērkonkrusts in Riga was held under the banner of national pride, with a strong focus on anti-immigrant rhetoric, which stirred tensions in multicultural parts of the capital.

2010 
The far-right political party National Alliance became more vocal in the national political discourse, promoting stricter immigration laws and policies aimed at reducing the influence of Russian-speaking communities in Latvia.

2011
Nationalist groups held anti-immigrant rallies in Riga, particularly targeting the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia. This period saw a spike in xenophobic rhetoric in political discourse, coinciding with the ongoing economic challenges Latvia faced during the aftermath of the financial crisis.

2013 
A series of right-wing protests against LGBT rights took place, including violent clashes between far-right groups and activists advocating for the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals.

2014 
The Latvian Nationalists party began to gain more traction with a hardline anti-Russian stance, coinciding with Russia's annexation of Crimea. Far-right groups rallied in support of Latvian nationalism, emphasizing the ethnic purity of Latvia and hostile rhetoric toward Russian-speaking citizens.

2015 
Anti-immigrant protests rose sharply as Latvia began to receive more refugees from the Middle East as part of the European Union's relocation plan. National Alliance organized a series of rallies demanding the rejection of refugee quotas.

2016
Anti-Russian sentiment peaked, with far-right groups holding rallies that criticized Russian influence in Latvia, often with xenophobic overtones targeting Russian-speaking Latvians. Several violent incidents occurred during protests, with some individuals associated with the far-right arrested for hate crimes.

2017 
The far-right group Latvian National Front organized a large anti-immigrant rally in Riga, calling for the expulsion of immigrants and the preservation of Latvia’s ethnic Latvian identity.

2018
Far-right groups in Latvia began organizing protests against the European Union, particularly in relation to policies on refugees and immigration. The National Alliance continued to increase its presence in local politics, with strong anti-EU rhetoric.

2019
The National Alliance and other far-right groups increased their participation in rallies that criticized the EU's migrant policies and the country's asylum-seeker intake program. There were several reports of violence between far-right and anti-fascist counter-protesters.

2020
In response to increasing EU refugee quotas, Latvia's far-right groups became more vocal, organizing demonstrations against migration and portraying refugees as a threat to national identity. The protests often included clashes with anti-fascist and pro-immigrant activists.

2021
Far-right extremism continued to rise, with Pērkonkrusts making a comeback, organizing events that spread nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-LGBTQ+ messages. Anti-Russian protests also increased in intensity, partly due to the political situation in Ukraine.

2022 
Right-wing nationalism continued to grow, with significant activity from Latvian Nationalists and National Alliance, particularly against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Far-right groups organized demonstrations with clear anti-Russian and pro-Latvian identity stances.

2023 
Far-right rhetoric centered around opposing Russian influence and increased anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment. National Alliance continued to be the dominant far-right party, participating in street demonstrations and promoting their nationalist agenda.

2024
Protests from far-right groups escalated as the Latvian government continued to receive refugees under EU migration schemes. Anti-EU demonstrations were more frequent, and far-right groups publicly criticized the government's refugee policies and ties with the European Union.

2025
Far-right political forces in Latvia, including National Alliance, continue to push a nationalist agenda, with growing influence in the political discourse. Anti-Russian protests and anti-immigrant actions continued to rise, often accompanied by violent confrontations between far-right activists and those advocating for immigrant and minority rights.

2005
Nationalist groups in Lithuania, especially those with neo-fascist ideologies, organized street marches to commemorate historical figures from Lithuania's interwar period, often invoking anti-Russian and anti-Semitic rhetoric. Pērkonkrusts also had ties to Lithuanian right-wing groups that participated in these demonstrations.

2006
Far-right groups in Lithuania staged protests against the government's increasing liberalization on minority rights. These protests were centered around Lithuanian nationalism and the protection of the Lithuanian identity from perceived foreign influence.

2007
The far-right in Lithuania began showing a more public face with an increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric, particularly directed at non-European migrants and refugees. This period also saw growing tension between Lithuanian nationalists and the Russian-speaking minority.

2008
Far-right extremists were involved in incidents of violence during rallies and protests, particularly in response to Lithuania's decision to support the European Union's stance on the recognition of the Russian Federation. Nationalists associated with Pērkonkrusts and Lithuanian Nationalist Movement organized events that clashed with left-wing counter-protesters.

2009
Right-wing extremism was especially visible during the economic downturn in Lithuania, with far-right groups blaming migrants and the EU for economic hardship. These groups organized protests against the government's handling of the crisis, while some of their rhetoric became more nationalistic and anti-immigrant.

2010
Far-right extremist groups in Lithuania continued to push a narrative of Lithuanian nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Protests escalated, with some members of extremist factions inciting violence against ethnic minorities, including Roma and Russian-speaking residents.

2011
The far-right group Lithuanian Nationalists staged protests against Lithuania's EU membership, with specific focus on the country's economic dependency on the EU. Anti-Russian sentiment was high during this period, and anti-Semitic rhetoric was increasingly apparent in public statements by extremist leaders.

2012
A rise in neo-fascist activities was recorded in Lithuania, with Pērkonkrusts taking part in violent demonstrations, particularly in response to the influx of immigrants. The group organized anti-refugee marches and engaged in direct clashes with left-wing and anti-fascist activists.

2013
Lithuanian Nationalist Movement increased its presence in politics and street activism. Far-right rhetoric and marches targeting ethnic minorities, especially the Russian-speaking population, became more common, with public demonstrations opposing Lithuania's role in the European Union.

2014
Far-right extremists in Lithuania took part in protests against Ukraine's crisis and the Russian invasion of Crimea. While the focus was ostensibly on supporting Ukraine, the rhetoric was also heavily anti-Russian, and many far-right groups utilized the situation to amplify their anti-immigrant and nationalistic stance.

2015
A significant surge in anti-refugee sentiment in Lithuania led to street protests organized by far-right groups. Lithuanian Nationalists and other extremist groups rallied against the EU's refugee relocation plan, frequently engaging in violent clashes with pro-refugee activists.

2016
Far-right movements in Lithuania gained strength in response to the EU’s refugee crisis. A series of rallies organized by nationalists, such as the Lithuanian National Front, expressed opposition to the country's asylum policies. Violence during protests and anti-immigrant actions were documented, particularly in the capital, Vilnius.

2017
Anti-immigrant protests and demonstrations, especially against Syrian refugees, were organized by far-right groups in Lithuania. These groups, many associated with Lithuanian Nationalists and Pērkonkrusts, engaged in violent confrontations with counter-demonstrators and pushed for a strict anti-immigration stance.

2018
The far-right continued to challenge Lithuania's EU policies, especially concerning migration. The Lithuanian Nationalists held rallies targeting not just refugees but also the LGBTQ+ community, with increased violence and hate crimes directed at perceived foreign threats.

2019
Far-right extremist actions in Lithuania were increasingly coordinated, with rallies focusing on anti-refugee sentiment, opposition to EU policies, and xenophobic rhetoric. Several hate crime incidents, particularly against immigrants and ethnic minorities, were reported during this period.

2020
Neo-fascist groups, particularly Pērkonkrusts, resumed more visible public protests against Lithuania’s immigration and refugee policies, often targeting asylum seekers, ethnic minorities, and the LGBTQ+ community. These demonstrations saw significant violence, and multiple arrests were made.

2021
Nationalist groups in Lithuania continued to gain ground, particularly after controversial EU policies on migration. Right-wing protests against the influx of refugees, particularly from the Middle East, led to violent clashes with pro-refugee activists. The Lithuanian National Front played a central role in organizing these protests.

2022
The far-right in Lithuania gained more visibility, organizing anti-immigrant protests and using social media to amplify their views. Tensions with Russia led to an increase in anti-Russian rallies, although these often blurred with nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment.

2023
Lithuanian Nationalists and far-right groups participated in public protests against migrants and the European Union's refugee policies. These protests often turned violent, and extremist ideologies promoting nationalism and ethnic purity were visible in the rhetoric.

2024
Lithuania's political climate saw increasing tension, with far-right rhetoric gaining traction against the backdrop of the refugee crisis. Several anti-immigrant protests occurred, and some extremist elements began to gain influence within the political mainstream, particularly in local elections.

2025
Right-wing extremism continued to rise in Lithuania, particularly with the resurgence of Pērkonkrusts and other far-right nationalist movements. Public demonstrations were increasingly anti-immigrant, anti-EU, and focused on defending Lithuanian identity, often resulting in violent confrontations.

2005
Luxembourg's far-right movements remained relatively small but were seen organizing protests against perceived European Union overreach and against increasing immigration, particularly from non-EU countries. These groups were mostly connected to nationalist ideologies, but major events did not escalate into widespread violence.

2006
A small number of neo-fascist groups in Luxembourg began organizing more visible anti-immigrant demonstrations. However, they did not attract much support from the wider public, and these groups remained on the fringe.

2007
The far-right began showing its influence through online platforms, promoting xenophobic rhetoric and anti-immigrant sentiment. Although protests were rare, extremist groups tried to gather more attention through hate speech, particularly targeting refugees and asylum seekers.

2009
Nationalist sentiment continued to rise, particularly in relation to European Union integration and migration policies. However, Luxembourg remained relatively peaceful compared to other European nations, with no major violent incidents linked to far-right groups.

2011
The Luxembourg Nationalist Party (LNP) was formed, though it remained marginal and did not gain much traction in mainstream politics. It espoused nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric, organizing protests against increasing immigration levels.

2013
Far-right groups in Luxembourg began using social media more effectively to spread anti-immigrant views and anti-EU rhetoric. However, despite occasional protests, there was no major escalation of violence or high-profile extremist actions in the country.

2014
Luxembourg witnessed a series of protests by far-right and nationalist groups, largely focused on opposition to immigration policies within the European Union. These protests were often countered by anti-fascist demonstrations, preventing large-scale violence.

2015
Right-wing extremism became more visible with protests against the European Union's refugee relocation quotas, although Luxembourg did not experience the same intensity of far-right violence seen in other European countries. Nonetheless, there was a notable increase in hate speech against migrants and refugees.

2016
Anti-immigration sentiment grew, largely in response to the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe. Right-wing groups in Luxembourg organized public rallies that condemned the EU's refugee relocation policies. These rallies were mostly peaceful but accompanied by significant online hate speech.

2018
Right-wing extremists in Luxembourg held protests against both the EU’s refugee policies and the increasing Muslim presence in the country. However, these protests remained small and were often countered by larger, peaceful anti-fascist demonstrations.

2019
Right-wing extremist activities remained low, with a few isolated hate crimes reported against immigrants and refugees. The rhetoric of far-right groups, however, became more virulent online, with xenophobic and nationalist views dominating some public discussions.

2020
With the global COVID-19 pandemic, there was a rise in conspiracy theories, including some promoted by far-right extremists, who linked the pandemic to anti-immigrant and anti-globalist rhetoric. There were small, socially distanced protests, but Luxembourg saw little in terms of violent far-right actions.

2021
Far-right groups continued to spread anti-EU, anti-immigrant, and nationalist messages in Luxembourg. While there were no major violent events, the rise of populist rhetoric was evident, especially regarding migration and the impact of European Union policies on Luxembourg’s sovereignty.

2022
Far-right extremist groups staged protests against the European Union’s policies regarding asylum seekers. Although the protests were relatively small, they echoed broader European sentiments and drew attention to the growing nationalist rhetoric in Luxembourg’s political discourse.

2023
Luxembourg saw a continuation of protests against refugees and asylum policies, organized primarily by far-right groups. These protests remained peaceful, but hate speech and online incitement to violence became more widespread.

2024
The far-right in Luxembourg maintained its presence with several protests against immigration and the European Union. These protests, often characterized by xenophobic slogans and nationalist rhetoric, remained largely non-violent but indicated growing tensions in political discourse.

2025
Far-right groups in Luxembourg continued to push anti-immigrant and anti-EU narratives, with some extremist factions becoming more visible in public demonstrations. However, despite some uptick in protests and hate speech, Luxembourg remained relatively insulated from large-scale violence or terrorist activity associated with right-wing extremism.

2005
Far-right groups in Malta began to express opposition to rising migration, particularly against the increasing number of African refugees arriving by sea. Small protests were held, focusing on the impact of immigration on the local economy and culture.

2007
Nationalist groups organized protests against the government's refugee policies, particularly focusing on the increase in asylum seekers from African countries. They raised concerns about Malta's ability to handle the growing refugee numbers.

2010
The first significant anti-immigration protest was organized by far-right groups, calling for tighter controls on Malta’s refugee intake. These protests marked the beginning of an increase in far-right activism focused on immigration issues.

2012
Far-right groups such as Forza Nuova and others began organizing larger demonstrations against the government's handling of migration, particularly focusing on the perceived threat of Muslim migrants.

2015
Amid the European refugee crisis, far-right groups in Malta organized protests against the government’s handling of refugees, demanding the country close its borders to migrants. These protests were fueled by rising concerns over the EU’s relocation scheme for refugees.

2017
Far-right movements in Malta saw a resurgence, organizing protests against EU refugee relocation policies and Malta’s role in accepting asylum seekers. Groups used slogans like “Malta for the Maltese” to push their nationalist agenda.

2020
Far-right groups increasingly mobilized against Malta’s handling of refugees, particularly during the pandemic. They used the crisis as an opportunity to reinforce their anti-immigrant rhetoric, organizing smaller protests and campaigns online.

2022
Far-right groups continued to organize protests, especially against the EU’s refugee relocation plans. The rhetoric of these protests grew more radical, with groups using social media to spread anti-immigrant sentiment.

2024
Protests continued with a focus on Malta’s refugee policies and its role in the EU’s migrant relocation plans. Far-right groups remained active, holding demonstrations against migration and voicing opposition to the government's policies on refugees.

2005
Far-right groups in the Netherlands began to organize small protests against immigration policies, focusing on concerns about the increasing number of Muslim immigrants. The protests were mainly centered around the perceived threat to Dutch culture and values.

2007
Right-wing groups, including the Dutch nationalist party, organized protests against what they perceived as an increasingly multicultural society. They raised concerns about the impact of immigration, particularly from Muslim countries, and the threat posed to national identity.

2010
The right-wing party, Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV), gained popularity with its anti-immigration stance. Wilders’ rhetoric became more aggressive, and the PVV held a number of rallies and public demonstrations against what they called "Islamization" of the Netherlands. The rise of this party marked a significant moment in the Dutch far-right movement.

2011
Far-right groups held demonstrations against the Dutch government’s stance on immigration and integration, particularly criticizing policies perceived as favoring refugees from Muslim-majority countries. There were violent clashes between anti-fascist groups and far-right activists.

2014
Right-wing extremist groups in the Netherlands, including Pegida Nederland, started organizing protests in opposition to Islam and immigration. These protests were met with significant counter-protests and were marked by aggressive rhetoric against migrants and Islam.

2015
As the European migrant crisis unfolded, far-right parties and groups in the Netherlands, particularly PVV, staged protests against the influx of refugees. Demonstrations calling for tighter immigration controls became more frequent, with anti-immigrant and anti-Islam messages central to their campaigns.

2016
Far-right groups in the Netherlands held multiple anti-refugee protests, particularly focusing on the European Union's refugee relocation policies. The PVV leader, Geert Wilders, continued to push an anti-immigrant, anti-Islam agenda, and these views were increasingly reflected in public protests organized by his supporters.

2017
Far-right protests in the Netherlands escalated, particularly in response to the government’s stance on asylum seekers and integration policies. Anti-immigrant rhetoric was widespread, with some groups calling for the closure of mosques and a complete halt to immigration.

2019
PVV and other far-right groups in the Netherlands gained significant traction with their anti-immigrant messages. Nationalist protests against the government's refugee policies became more frequent, often involving direct clashes between far-right demonstrators and counter-protesters.

2020
Far-right protests continued as the debate over immigration and integration remained a central issue. The COVID-19 pandemic was used by some far-right groups to fuel anti-immigrant rhetoric, framing refugees as a "threat" to public health. Protests were more sporadic, but the rhetoric continued to spread on social media.

2021
The right-wing party Forum for Democracy (FvD) gained ground with its anti-immigration stance. Protests continued, although they were smaller in scale compared to previous years. The rhetoric of right-wing groups remained rooted in anti-immigrant and anti-Islam ideologies.

2022
PVV and other far-right parties continued to rally against the government's refugee and immigration policies. A surge in protests against the EU’s refugee quotas was seen, and online hate speech directed at migrants and refugees became more widespread.

2023
Far-right demonstrations against the Dutch government's handling of refugees continued to grow. The rhetoric became more aggressive, with some groups calling for the expulsion of immigrants from the Netherlands. Anti-immigrant sentiment remained high, especially on social media platforms.

2024
The far-right remained active in the Netherlands, with continued protests and demonstrations against immigration policies. The rhetoric was more nationalistic and focused on concerns about preserving Dutch identity and culture. Far-right political movements gained more ground in the political landscape.

2025
The far-right in the Netherlands continues to play a significant role in political discourse, with a particular focus on anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment. Protests and demonstrations organized by far-right groups against government immigration policies remained frequent, and the rhetoric surrounding these protests continued to grow more radical.

2005
Far-right groups in Poland began to organize protests against immigration, focusing on opposition to refugees from Muslim-majority countries. The protests were linked to growing nationalist sentiments in Europe, with some groups framing immigration as a threat to Poland’s cultural and religious identity.

2007
The rise of the nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR) and other far-right factions led to several protests against the European Union's immigration policies. These groups were particularly concerned with the influx of immigrants from outside Europe, especially from Muslim-majority countries.

2010
LPR and other right-wing groups continued to protest against the government’s pro-European stance on immigration. They raised concerns about the integration of refugees and criticized the government for its openness to accepting migrants from non-European countries.

2013
The National Radical Camp (ONR), a far-right nationalist group, gained attention with its street protests against immigration policies. They protested against the European Union’s proposed quotas for refugee relocation, focusing particularly on opposition to refugees from Muslim-majority countries.

2015
Following the European migrant crisis, far-right groups, including ONR and Kukiz'15, held large protests against the government’s handling of refugees. The protests were marked by a significant rise in anti-Muslim rhetoric, with nationalist groups calling for Poland to reject EU refugee quotas and tighten immigration controls.

2016
Nationalist and far-right groups, including ONR and All-Poland Youth, held protests against the Polish government's refugee policies. They framed the influx of refugees as a threat to Poland’s national identity, cultural values, and security. This year marked the peak of anti-immigrant sentiment within Polish far-right movements.

2017
Far-right demonstrations continued, especially in response to the European Union's refugee relocation policies. Polish nationalist groups took part in protests against the EU’s plans, and there was an increase in public displays of anti-Islam sentiment. Polish nationalists, including groups like ONR, called for the complete closure of Poland's borders to refugees and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries.

2018
Far-right movements in Poland, particularly ONR and Kukiz'15, continued to mobilize against immigration, with frequent protests against government policies perceived as too accommodating to migrants and refugees. These protests were often linked to broader nationalist and anti-EU rhetoric.

2019
The far-right’s influence grew in Polish politics, especially with the Law and Justice Party (PiS) taking a more hardline stance on immigration. Far-right protests against immigration and EU refugee quotas remained frequent, with groups like ONR continuing to rally against the government’s approach to the migrant crisis.

2020
Nationalist groups and right-wing factions in Poland became increasingly vocal, with continued opposition to the European Union’s handling of the refugee crisis. Anti-immigrant protests continued, with far-right groups voicing concerns over Poland’s involvement in the relocation of refugees under EU mandates.

2021
ONR, PiS, and other far-right factions continued to organize anti-immigrant protests, particularly against the government’s stance on accepting refugees. Protests became more focused on national identity and sovereignty, with demonstrators framing refugees as a threat to Polish culture and values.

2022
Far-right groups continued to protest against immigration policies, particularly in relation to the war in Ukraine. While there was some support for Ukrainian refugees, nationalist factions remained highly critical of the government's broader immigration policies, especially regarding refugees from the Middle East and Africa.

2023
Protests continued, especially after Poland’s government took steps to align more closely with the EU’s refugee policies. Far-right movements in Poland, including ONR and others, pushed back against these policies, staging demonstrations and calling for stricter immigration laws and the expulsion of refugees from Muslim-majority countries.

2024
Far-right protests remained a fixture of Polish political life, particularly in response to ongoing debates over immigration and refugee policies. The PiS party continued to take a hardline stance on immigration, aligning with far-right groups in its rhetoric against refugees and migrants. Protests by right-wing groups focused on nationalism, sovereignty, and resistance to EU policies.

2025
Poland’s far-right rhetoric continues to influence the political climate, with groups like ONR and PiS maintaining strong opposition to immigration. Protests and demonstrations against EU refugee relocation policies have remained a staple of Polish far-right activism, and nationalism continues to be a prominent theme in public discourse.

2005
Far-right groups in Portugal began to organize small protests focusing on anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly targeting the increase in immigration from former Portuguese-speaking African countries. These protests were often centered around economic concerns and the perceived strain on public services caused by immigration.

2007
Nationalist groups, including small far-right organizations, held protests against immigration policies, particularly criticizing the government's stance on the integration of immigrants from Africa and Asia. The protests were part of a broader European trend of rising far-right activism.

2010
The rise of nationalist sentiment led to a series of small protests against the government’s handling of immigration, with groups such as The National Renovator Party (PNR) becoming more vocal in their opposition to the influx of immigrants, particularly from non-European countries.

2011
Anti-immigrant rhetoric gained traction, with far-right groups organizing protests against what they perceived as the erosion of Portuguese culture and identity. The PNR and other nationalist groups staged demonstrations against the government's pro-immigration policies.

2015
As the European migrant crisis unfolded, right-wing parties such as PNR and others began organizing more frequent protests. They framed the crisis as a threat to Portugal’s national security, economy, and culture, particularly in relation to Muslim refugees and asylum seekers. These protests were focused on keeping Portugal's borders closed and rejecting EU relocation schemes.

2016
Far-right and nationalist groups continued to protest against the arrival of refugees and immigrants, with particular opposition to the EU’s refugee redistribution quotas. These protests were part of a broader European movement that linked immigration with concerns over national security and cultural identity.

2018
Right-wing demonstrations, particularly from the PNR and Chega, increased in opposition to immigration policies. The rhetoric became more aggressive, and protesters voiced opposition to the government’s acceptance of refugees and immigrants, framing them as threats to Portuguese society.

2020
Far-right groups, including Chega, gained more visibility as they staged protests against the government’s response to the migrant crisis, voicing their concerns over the perceived Islamization of Portugal. The party also criticized the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, using the crisis as an opportunity to reinforce anti-immigrant and nationalist rhetoric.

2021
The Chega party, a far-right movement, continued to rise in popularity, with protests and political campaigns centered around anti-immigrant sentiment, particularly focusing on refugees from North Africa and the Middle East. The party's influence in the political landscape grew, and its supporters increasingly took to the streets to express opposition to immigration policies.

2022
Anti-immigrant protests, particularly against the EU's refugee policies, remained a key issue for far-right groups like Chega. These protests were accompanied by rhetoric emphasizing Portugal’s need to protect its culture and national identity from what they saw as foreign influence.

2023
Far-right groups in Portugal continued their opposition to the government's refugee policies. Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiment remained a central theme in their protests. Some of the more radical far-right elements began calling for stricter immigration laws and even deportations of migrants already living in the country.

2024
Chega solidified its position in the political landscape, advocating for stricter immigration policies and organizing protests against the government’s handling of immigration and asylum seekers. The far-right groups maintained a strong presence in national debates surrounding refugees, immigration, and national identity.

2025
Portugal's political climate remained influenced by far-right rhetoric, particularly from Chega. The party continued to advocate for a nationalist agenda, focusing on anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies. Protests and demonstrations against the government’s immigration policies remained prevalent, with calls for reducing immigration and preserving Portuguese cultural identity.

2005
Far-right protests and demonstrations began to grow in Romania, primarily fueled by nationalist groups like the Greater Romania Party (PRM). These protests focused on anti-immigrant sentiments, especially against Roma communities, and calls for stronger national identity in opposition to EU integration.

2007
The PRM continued to hold anti-immigrant and anti-minority demonstrations. A rise in xenophobic rhetoric characterized these protests, with far-right groups advocating for more stringent controls on immigration, particularly against ethnic minorities and refugees.

2010
PRM and other nationalist groups organized several protests against the government's pro-EU policies and immigration laws. These protests were framed around the perceived threat of foreign influence on Romanian culture and society.

2013
The far-right group Noua Dreaptă (New Right) gained increased visibility, organizing rallies against the European Union and pushing anti-immigration agendas. These groups were vocal in their opposition to refugees, particularly from non-European countries, and were critical of Romania's participation in EU refugee relocation programs.

2015
Noua Dreaptă and other nationalist organizations organized large anti-immigration demonstrations, particularly against the European Union’s refugee quotas. The protests featured anti-refugee and anti-Muslim rhetoric, calling for Romania to reject the relocation of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa.

2017
Romania witnessed a rise in far-right activity, particularly in opposition to the influx of refugees into Europe. Noua Dreaptă and other nationalist factions continued to organize protests against the EU’s migrant policies, and anti-refugee sentiment grew among segments of the population.

2018
Noua Dreaptă led a series of protests against Romania’s support for EU refugee quotas. These protests were framed around nationalism and national identity, with far-right groups positioning themselves as protectors of Romanian cultural values against foreign influences.

2019
The nationalist right, including Noua Dreaptă, organized a series of anti-immigrant rallies, focusing on the issue of refugees and calling for tighter border control. These rallies were particularly vocal against the EU's refugee policies, with far-right groups emphasizing Romania’s sovereignty in resisting refugee relocation.

2020
Noua Dreaptă and other far-right groups continued to stage protests against the EU’s migrant policies, with specific focus on rejecting refugees from Muslim-majority countries. These protests were part of a broader wave of anti-immigrant and nationalist sentiment that characterized Romanian politics at the time.

2021
Protests against the Romanian government's handling of immigration, particularly regarding refugees and migrants from outside Europe, continued. Nationalist groups like Noua Dreaptă intensified their rhetoric against Muslim refugees and advocated for more stringent controls on immigration.

2022
Far-right groups in Romania continued to protest against immigration and the EU’s refugee relocation programs. The Noua Dreaptă organization staged demonstrations highlighting nationalist and anti-EU sentiments, framing Romania’s national identity as under threat from foreign influence.

2023
Noua Dreaptă and other nationalist factions continued to oppose the EU’s immigration policies, particularly focusing on the integration of refugees from Muslim-majority countries. There was a notable increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric, with far-right groups calling for Romania to close its borders to refugees.

2024
The far-right’s influence continued to be felt in Romania, particularly in the context of immigration debates. Noua Dreaptă and other right-wing groups organized protests against the EU’s migrant policies and Romania's involvement in refugee relocation programs. These protests were marked by anti-immigrant rhetoric and nationalistic calls for sovereignty.

2025
Far-right groups in Romania, led by Noua Dreaptă and similar organizations, maintained strong opposition to immigration, particularly from non-European countries. Nationalist and anti-EU sentiments continued to dominate the political discourse, with frequent protests and demonstrations against the government’s stance on refugees and immigrants.

2006
Slovak National Party (SNS), a far-right nationalist party, gained influence in the Slovak parliament. The party, led by Ján Slota, made inflammatory comments regarding ethnic minorities, particularly the Hungarian minority, and sought to promote Slovak nationalism through aggressive rhetoric.

2008
Slovakia saw a rise in extremist right-wing activities, with several nationalist groups, including Slovenská pospolitosť (Slovak Togetherness), staging rallies and protests. These groups voiced strong opposition to immigration, the European Union, and the influence of ethnic minorities, especially Romani and Hungarian communities.

2010
ĽSNS (People's Party of Slovakia), a far-right populist party led by Marian Kotleba, started gaining momentum with its anti-Roma and anti-immigrant rhetoric. They organized protests and used inflammatory language targeting ethnic minorities and advocating for the preservation of Slovak national identity.

2012
ĽSNS continued to grow, with more far-right demonstrations against Roma communities. The party called for strict measures to curb the influence of the Roma population, including segregation and exclusion from society. The party's rhetoric and public appearances sparked tensions between various ethnic groups.

2014
The rise of far-right parties like ĽSNS and their nationalist ideologies intensified. Anti-immigrant demonstrations became common, particularly targeting the EU’s migrant policies. Far-right activists promoted slogans such as "Slovakia for Slovaks" and expressed opposition to the perceived influence of refugees and minorities.

2015
ĽSNS organized several protests against the European Union’s migrant relocation policies. This included aggressive anti-refugee and anti-immigrant demonstrations, which saw violence from right-wing extremists targeting minority groups, especially Roma and Muslims.

2016
ĽSNS, along with other far-right groups, led a campaign against the migration policies of the European Union. They voiced strong opposition to the EU’s efforts to relocate refugees, with protests that turned violent in some instances. Anti-Roma sentiment continued to rise as well, with several incidents of aggression targeting Roma communities.

2017
Far-right activists from ĽSNS were involved in organizing large protests against migrants and Roma communities, with violent clashes occurring during some of these demonstrations. The far-right also began to target left-wing activists, accusing them of promoting liberalism and multiculturalism.

2018
Right-wing extremism continued to spread, with ĽSNS organizing demonstrations against the government’s stance on refugees and minorities. Anti-Roma violence increased during this time, with several attacks on Roma communities and calls for their removal from Slovak society.

2019
Far-right groups, including ĽSNS, escalated their attacks on Roma settlements, with numerous reports of aggression towards Roma individuals. Anti-migrant and anti-immigrant protests were frequent, and the far-right rhetoric surrounding the refugee crisis continued to dominate national discourse.

2020
ĽSNS gained more influence in the Slovak parliament, with anti-immigrant and anti-Roma rhetoric becoming more mainstream. There were also reports of hate crimes and violence against ethnic minorities, particularly Roma, spurred on by the party’s populist and nationalistic agenda.

2021
Slovakia witnessed an increase in far-right protests, particularly in opposition to the government's handling of the refugee crisis and migration. ĽSNS continued to be active, organizing demonstrations against the EU’s migrant policies, and voicing opposition to the settlement of refugees in Slovakia. Several violent confrontations between far-right activists and counter-protesters were reported.

2022
ĽSNS and other far-right groups continued to make headlines, advocating for the preservation of Slovak national identity and organizing protests against migrants and refugees. Right-wing extremist groups began to target ethnic minorities, including Roma and other immigrant communities, calling for more stringent controls and restrictions.

2023
Far-right rhetoric continued to intensify, with ĽSNS leading protests against refugees, Roma, and immigrants. The group's leaders, including Marian Kotleba, continued to promote an agenda of exclusion and nationalism, organizing protests across Slovakia that occasionally turned violent.

2024
ĽSNS continued to be a dominant force in promoting anti-immigrant sentiment, and violence against Roma and migrant communities spiked. There were frequent clashes between far-right groups and counter-protesters. Far-right political influence remained significant, and extremist rhetoric against non-Slovak populations escalated.

2025
The far-right in Slovakia maintained its presence, with ĽSNS and other extremist groups continuing their campaign against immigrants, particularly refugees from the Middle East and Africa. Tensions between ethnic minorities and far-right groups persisted, and violent incidents against Roma communities continued to rise.

2007
The Slovenian National Party (SNS), a far-right nationalist party, became more vocal in its opposition to immigration and ethnic minorities, especially Roma. The party led several protests against the government’s approach to migrant and refugee policies, and supported the exclusion of minority communities in the public sphere.

2008
The far-right continued to rise with SNS and Zeleni Slovenija (Green Slovenia), both groups aligning against immigration policies and the presence of minorities, particularly the Roma community. There were multiple incidents of verbal attacks and aggressive rhetoric against Roma people.

2010
Right-wing extremism surged with anti-immigrant sentiment being promoted by several groups. Far-right activists protested against the European Union’s migration policies, with the SNS leading some rallies and demonstrations calling for stricter controls on immigration, particularly from Muslim countries.

2012
SNS and other right-wing organizations increasingly targeted refugees and migrants, organizing public protests against their arrival in Slovenia. Anti-Roma sentiments also grew, with multiple public demonstrations aimed at forcing Roma communities out of certain regions.

2015
As part of the refugee crisis in Europe, Slovenia saw a rise in far-right activity. The SNS, alongside other nationalist groups, mobilized protests against refugees entering the country, using strong anti-Muslim rhetoric. Right-wing extremists were involved in confrontations with counter-protesters, and there were reports of verbal and physical attacks on refugees and migrants.

2016
Nationalist and far-right groups in Slovenia staged several anti-refugee demonstrations. The SNS led a campaign against the refugee quota system and the settlement of migrants in Slovenia. There were violent protests and a rise in hate speech directed at migrant communities, especially from those advocating for Slovenia to remain "ethnically pure."

2017
Anti-immigrant demonstrations continued, with the SNS and similar groups targeting migrants, particularly refugees from Muslim-majority countries. These protests were marked by the use of extreme rhetoric and, at times, violent actions against migrant groups and counter-demonstrators.

2018
Slovenia saw a growing influence of far-right groups, with protests intensifying against the government’s stance on refugee resettlement. SNS continued its role in stoking nationalist sentiment and organizing street protests against migrants, while xenophobic rhetoric became more prominent in the media and political discourse.

2019
Right-wing extremism in Slovenia was marked by a rise in anti-migrant, anti-refugee rhetoric. SNS continued to play a major role in opposing EU immigration policies, organizing rallies and public actions. Several violent incidents involving far-right extremists targeting migrants and refugees were reported.

2020
The SNS and other right-wing groups continued their campaign against migrants and refugees, especially refugees from Syria and other Middle Eastern countries. Far-right activists organized protests in several cities, demanding that the government refuse to accept asylum seekers. Violent confrontations between protesters and migrants, as well as with left-wing activists, were common.

2021
The far-right sentiment in Slovenia grew, with SNS and nationalist groups continuing to promote an exclusionary, anti-immigrant agenda. Protests against the European Union’s refugee policy became more frequent, and violent incidents targeting Roma and migrant communities continued. Right-wing extremist rhetoric became more visible in the country’s political discourse.

2022
Anti-migrant and anti-refugee protests led by far-right groups, including SNS, continued. Rhetoric targeting minorities, especially Roma and Muslims, became more violent and confrontational. Right-wing extremists intensified their public campaigns, calling for a return to Slovenian nationalism and the exclusion of migrant communities.

2023
SNS and other far-right organizations in Slovenia maintained their aggressive stance against immigration, with protests and demonstrations frequently turning violent. The anti-immigrant narrative was often tied to broader nationalist ideologies, which continued to fuel right-wing extremism and hate crimes, especially against the Roma community.

2024
The far-right continued to assert its presence in Slovenia, with SNS and similar groups staging anti-migrant protests and rallies against government policies. The public discourse around migrants and refugees became more polarized, with violent confrontations between far-right activists and counter-demonstrators occurring regularly.

2025
Far-right activity remained high in Slovenia, with SNS and other nationalist groups continuing to promote anti-immigrant policies. The rhetoric against refugees, particularly Muslims and Roma, persisted, and violent incidents involving right-wing extremists continued. Nationalist and anti-immigrant demonstrations were commonplace, and the public rhetoric reflected the ongoing rise in far-right ideologies.

2006
Nationalist and far-right groups began to ramp up their rhetoric in opposition to Spain's immigration policies. Several protests were organized in Madrid and Barcelona, targeting Muslim and African immigrants. These protests were marked by nationalist slogans and anti-immigrant violence in some regions.

2007
The Spanish far-right party, Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), gained visibility by organizing anti-immigrant rallies in Catalonia. The protests often involved violent clashes between nationalist demonstrators and counter-protesters, particularly in immigrant-dense urban areas.

2008
Nationalist and right-wing extremists continued their protests, calling for the expulsion of immigrants, particularly from Muslim-majority countries. The PxC led a number of public events that encouraged xenophobia, with violent altercations reported in regions like Barcelona and Tarragona.

2010
The Spanish far-right organized a series of violent street protests against the increasing number of refugees and immigrants in Spain. There were reports of attacks against immigrants, especially in southern Spain, where far-right groups blamed migrants for rising unemployment and social issues.

2011
The extreme-right group Movimiento Social Republicano (MSR) and Democracia Nacional gained momentum with a more aggressive anti-immigration campaign. The MSR organized public rallies that were often followed by violent clashes with left-wing activists. Anti-refugee sentiment became increasingly visible in urban areas.

2012
Right-wing extremists, including groups like Democracia Nacional, escalated their activities, staging demonstrations and street protests against the government’s policies on refugees. The Spanish far-right began to link the economic crisis to the rise in immigration, fueling xenophobic rhetoric and attacks on migrants.

2013
Far-right violence escalated with a series of attacks on immigrant communities, particularly in Catalonia, which saw a rise in attacks against North African and sub-Saharan migrants. These incidents were often accompanied by protests organized by nationalist groups like PxC.

2014
Spain’s far-right groups, including Partido Popular (PP) members with nationalist affiliations, increasingly mobilized against refugees and immigrants. PxC and MSR led protests against the government's stance on immigration, and violent incidents targeting immigrants were reported in regions like Barcelona and Madrid.

2015
The refugee crisis in Europe further radicalized right-wing groups in Spain. PxC organized large protests against the European Union’s refugee quotas, and there were violent incidents involving clashes between far-right demonstrators and immigrant communities. Right-wing extremist groups used the protests to push anti-refugee, anti-Muslim messages.

2016

Right-wing extremists in Spain began organizing more visible campaigns against the settlement of refugees and immigrants. MSR and other far-right groups held protests that were often marred by violent confrontations with migrants, particularly in southern Spain. These protests were part of a broader European trend of right-wing nationalism.

2017
Right-wing violence in Spain reached a peak in Catalonia, where the far-right group Democracia Nacionalengaged in violent protests against Catalan independence supporters. Anti-immigrant sentiments remained high, particularly in response to increasing numbers of refugees arriving on Spain’s southern coast.

2018
Far-right parties like VOX gained increasing attention due to their anti-immigrant and nationalist rhetoric. Their influence was evident in demonstrations against immigration, particularly in southern Spain, where clashes between far-right groups and migrant communities increased.

2019
VOX, a far-right political party, achieved significant electoral success and further normalized anti-immigrant rhetoric in mainstream politics. Several violent incidents were linked to the party's supporters, including protests against refugees and violent confrontations with left-wing groups. These events escalated tensions in cities like Madrid and Seville.

2020
Far-right groups continued to target immigrants, particularly those from Muslim-majority countries, with anti-refugee protests held across Spain. VOX continued its rise, organizing demonstrations that often led to violent incidents involving both counter-protesters and migrant communities.

2021
The political influence of VOX and other nationalist groups grew, with anti-immigrant rhetoric becoming a central issue in national debates. Far-right violence remained prevalent, with protests targeting both refugees and the government’s migration policies. Violent clashes at public demonstrations were increasingly common.

2022
VOX continued to dominate the far-right scene, leading large protests against the government’s immigration policies. There were reports of increasing hostility toward migrant communities, with far-right extremists taking part in violent acts targeting immigrants, particularly from North Africa and sub-Saharan regions.

2023
Right-wing extremism in Spain remained on the rise, with VOX leading several anti-immigrant rallies and protests. Clashes between far-right groups and migrants became more frequent, especially in regions with high migrant populations, such as Andalusia and Catalonia.

2024
Far-right violence continued, with VOX gaining more power in local and national politics. Anti-refugee and anti-Muslim protests were increasingly common, with far-right extremists targeting migrant communities with acts of intimidation and violence. Protests organized by VOX and other groups often led to clashes with left-wing activists.

2025
VOX and other far-right groups solidified their influence in Spain, with anti-immigrant and nationalist rhetoric dominating public discourse. The frequency of violent attacks against migrant communities increased, and right-wing extremism became a significant political force.

2006
Far-right groups such as Sverigedemokraterna (SD) began to increase their influence, staging protests and spreading anti-immigrant rhetoric. Clashes occurred between right-wing extremists and left-wing activists in several cities, particularly in Stockholm and Malmö, where tensions surrounding immigration were growing.

2007
Sverigedemokraterna made significant strides in the political landscape, especially in the south of Sweden. Anti-immigrant protests were organized by right-wing extremists, and violence against immigrants, particularly refugees from Middle Eastern countries, was reported in various parts of Sweden.

2008
Right-wing extremists linked to Sverigedemokraterna continued to organize anti-immigrant rallies, with violent clashes between far-right groups and counter-protesters. Malmö, in particular, saw several instances of right-wing violence targeting Muslim communities.

2009
Far-right violence in Sweden escalated as Sverigedemokraterna continued to push their nationalist, anti-immigrant agenda. Protests in cities like Göteborg and Malmö turned violent, with confrontations between right-wing extremists and immigrant communities.

2010
Sverigedemokraterna became a major force in Swedish politics after entering the Swedish Parliament. Right-wing extremists, emboldened by the party’s rise, organized violent protests against refugees and immigrants, particularly in southern Sweden.

2011
Right-wing violence intensified as Sverigedemokraterna gained more support. A series of protests targeting immigration policies led to clashes with police and counter-protesters, particularly in Stockholm and Malmö, where there was a rising tension between right-wing groups and immigrant communities.

2012
Anti-immigrant protests organized by Sverigedemokraterna and other far-right groups became more common. Violent incidents occurred, particularly in Malmö, where several attacks on refugee centers and migrant communities were reported.

2013
Sverigedemokraterna continued to dominate Swedish far-right politics, organizing protests that led to violent incidents in Malmö and Stockholm. The rise in anti-immigrant sentiment and xenophobic violence in southern Sweden was particularly marked during this year.

2014
Right-wing violence increased, with Sverigedemokraterna continuing their rise in the national elections. There were several attacks on immigrant communities and refugee centers, particularly in Malmö, where far-right extremists targeted asylum seekers and refugees. Violent clashes between far-right groups and left-wing activists were also reported.

2015
The European refugee crisis exacerbated far-right sentiments in Sweden. Sverigedemokraterna became more influential, and right-wing extremist groups organized protests against the government’s handling of refugees. Violent incidents, including attacks on migrant shelters, were reported in Stockholm, Malmö, and Göteborg.

2016
Far-right violence continued to escalate in Sweden, with several high-profile attacks on refugees and immigrants. Sverigedemokraterna held large rallies, often followed by violent clashes with counter-protesters and immigrant communities. The rhetoric of these groups became more extreme, blaming refugees for rising crime and unemployment.

2017
Sverigedemokraterna continued to rise in popularity, and right-wing extremists in Sweden organized more anti-immigrant demonstrations. Attacks on immigrant communities, particularly in Malmö and Stockholm, spiked as far-right violence spread across the country.

2018
The rise of Sverigedemokraterna continued, and anti-immigrant violence became more widespread. In cities like Malmö and Göteborg, there were numerous reports of right-wing extremist attacks on refugees and immigrants. Violent protests against immigration policies led to clashes with police and left-wing counter-protesters.

2019
Right-wing violence in Sweden remained high, with Sverigedemokraterna and other far-right groups leading protests and spreading anti-immigrant rhetoric. Violent incidents, including attacks on migrant shelters and immigrant communities, continued to occur, particularly in southern Sweden.

2020
Far-right violence surged in Sweden, with Sverigedemokraterna continuing their dominance in Swedish politics. Anti-refugee and anti-Muslim sentiments fueled violent protests, particularly in Stockholm and Malmö. There were reports of increasing clashes between far-right groups and left-wing activists.

2021
Far-right violence, led by Sverigedemokraterna and other right-wing extremist groups, continued to escalate in Sweden. Violent protests against immigration and refugee policies led to clashes in Malmö, Göteborg, and Stockholm, with immigrants being targeted in violent attacks.

2022
Right-wing extremism in Sweden saw a surge, particularly in response to Sweden's growing immigrant population. Sverigedemokraterna continued to influence public discourse with their anti-immigrant rhetoric, and violent protests against refugees and immigrants were frequent in southern Sweden.

2023
Far-right extremism remained a major issue in Sweden, with Sverigedemokraterna continuing to grow in influence. Right-wing violence against immigrants and refugees continued to escalate, particularly in urban centers like Malmö, Göteborg, and Stockholm.

2024
Sverigedemokraterna continued to push their nationalist, anti-immigrant agenda, leading to more violent protests. The far-right groups' rhetoric reached new extremes, and violent clashes between right-wing extremists and counter-protesters became more common. Attacks on refugee centers and immigrant communities continued to rise.